This paper discusses the concept of leverage, its components and how to measure and monitor it. It proposes an innovative approach to assessing leverage based on flows using the concept of a marginal leverage ratio, which reveals the leverage related to new activities, as a valuable supplement to the traditional absolute leverage ratio. The marginal leverage ratio can be used as an early warning tool to signal potential episodes of excessive leverage and to understand if, and how, banks deleverage. Besides capturing the leveraging-deleveraging cycles better than the absolute leverage ratio, the marginal leverage ratio provides an indication of risks that a stable absolute leverage ratio can conceal.
1.-INTRODUCTION
A bank's balance sheet can be compared to a tree. The capital or equity would be the roots which feed and support the rest of the balance sheet. The debt or liabilities would be the aerial part of the tree (trunk and treetop). The proportion of the overall size of the tree with respect to its roots would be the leverage.
The financial crisis triggered the reinforcing of capital requirements. The question may not be whether the health and quality of capital is enough but rather whether excessive liabilities could make banks vulnerable to financial turmoil. Storms are not a daily occurrence but they are equally not an unusual phenomenon. To prevent disaster, financial systems should be designed to withstand recurring financial turmoil.
Deficiency in the supervision of banks was one of the multiple causes of the crisis. Public authorities reacted, both at national and international level, by reinforcing the supervisory framework. In the EU, for instance, the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) 1 was created and negotiations are on-going to establish a Banking Union (European Commission, 2012b) .
At global level, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2011) established a new framework of prudential requirements for financial institutions commonly known as the Basel III Agreement. In order to address some of the risks detected during the recent crisis, Basel III introduces, for the first time, a leverage ratio as an international standard prudential tool (some jurisdictions, such as the US, already had a leverage ratio as part of their prudential tools). Although often seen as a classic concept in finance, leverage is sometimes ambiguously or inaccurately employed, not only in the media and policy arenas but also in academic literature.
This paper aims to contribute to a more robust use of the concept of leverage as an analytical and policy tool. For this, the paper presents a new approach to leverage based on flows, the marginal leverage ratio, which can be used as an early warning tool to detect periods of excessive leverage.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, the concept of leverage is explained and the innovative marginal leverage ratio is introduced. Section 3 presents the main drivers of leverage: the valuation effects and the leverage targets. Section 4 applies the findings of the previous two sections to country data. Finally, the conclusions, recommendations and avenues for further analysis are discussed in Section 5.
2.-WHAT IS FINANCIAL LEVERAGE AND HOW TO MEASURE IT
This section explains the concept of financial leverage. The classical measure of leverage based on the static picture shown by the balance sheet does not seem to properly capture the risks embedded in the build-up of leverage. A "marginal" leverage ratio appears to be a good complement to better grasp the increasing risks linked to leverage. This new marginal leverage ratio is a dynamic measure of leverage based on the activities undertaken over a certain period of time.
2.1.-WHAT IS FINANCIAL LEVERAGE
The concept of financial leverage has been borrowed from physics. A lever allows the amplification of an input force in order to provide a greater output force. In a similar way, financial leverage allows to amplify the assets that can be obtained from a given amount of (own) resources.
Financial derivatives, such as options, futures or forwards, are typically highly leveraged products. The payment of a premium or a margin is just a fraction of the strike price that will (or could, in the case of an option) be paid by the delivery date.
For an economic agent, the financial leverage indicates the relative importance of debt with respect to its capital (or equity). Leverage is commonly expressed as the ratio of total assets to equity but alternative formulations such as debt to equity or debt to total assets are also possible. Throughout this paper, the definition of leverage as the ratio of total assets to equity will be used.
A certain level of leverage is not only healthy, but it is also critical for the well-functioning of an economy. Leverage stems from the fact that some of the assets of a corporation are financed with funds other than equity. The existence of debt (and leverage) enables economic agents to allocate their resources (or consumption) over time according to their preferences. In other words, debt (and leverage) facilitates the channelling of resources from savers with an excess of funds to investment projects in need of financing.
The banking system through its intermediation function constitutes a cornerstone in the process of channelling funds from savers to investors and, therefore, banks operate with unusually high leverage (Flannery, 1994, p. 320) . The role of prudential regulation and supervision is to avoid extreme positions in the financial sector, including in respect of leverage, that can eventually become highly damaging.
Prudential rules require banks to hold a minimum amount of capital due to its capacity to absorb losses, but the risks embedded in leverage go beyond incurring losses to also include liquidity risks as identified by Flannery (1994) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) . One of the traditional functions of banks is maturity transformation, where short term (liquid) deposits are transformed into long term (illiquid) loans. The demand for liquidity by depositors may arrive at an inconvenient time and force the quick-fire liquidation of illiquid assets.
This liquidity risk was present in both sides of the Atlantic in the outbreak of the crisis. Angelides et al. (2011, pp. xix-xx) states that, as of 2007, the five major US investment banks were operating with leverage ratios as high as 40 to 1 and much of their borrowing was short-term. For example, at the end of 2007, Bear Stearns had to roll over $70 bn of liabilities every day, while its equity was $11.8 bn. In Europe, the European Central Bank (ECB) (2009, p. 10) shows that, in the run up to the crisis, European banks also increased their dependence on money market funding providing short-term liquidity.
In our metaphor, the leverage is not about how small the roots are, but how big the rest of the tree is. Bonsai gardeners do not modify the intrinsic characteristics of the tree (as genetic techniques can do), but they use a number of techniques to guide the size and shape of the bonsais. One particular technique employed by bonsai gardeners is to prune the roots, but this is not enough: they need to combine it with other techniques to guide the trunk, branches and leaves. Supervisory authorities should be able to steer the growth of banks using different approaches. The introduction of liquidity ratios such as the LCR and NFSR (Basel III, should not exclude the use of a leverage ratio to capture the overall liquidity risk.
With the outbreak of the crisis, leverage and deleveraging have become fashionable terms but they are not always used accurately. In particular, I would like to highlight two uses that can create confusion.
Firstly, "deleveraging" is often used to mean an "undesirable" or "disorderly" contraction in total assets as opposed to an expansion in equity. However, as leverage is the relation between assets and equity, it is inaccurate to use the term to indicate the evolution of one of the components only (unless you are explicitly undertaking a ceteris paribus analysis).
Secondly, Basel III defines leverage as the ratio of capital to total assets 2 , which is an inverse of the usual definition. Although mathematically equivalent, the Basel III formulation conceals the multiplicative effect of leverage and the liquidity risks explained above. In this sense, it seems counterintuitive that Basel III proposes to constrain [excessive] leverage by imposing a minimum leverage ratio (paragraphs 152 and 165). When the leverage ratio is defined as total assets to equity, a cap can be imposed to avoid excesses. The 3% floor for the (inverse) leverage ratio proposed by Basel III would correspond to a cap of about 30 to 1 under the usual definition of leverage.
Maybe the regulators participating to the Basel III process did not feel comfortable with a complex expression such as "N to 1" or they preferred to normalise the leverage ratio with a percentage. In order to address these concerns, a definition of leverage as debt to total assets could be used, because it expresses better the relative size of the debt. With this definition, the cap would be 97% (the complementary of 3%).
Once the concept of leverage has been clarified, we can look at the actual evolution of leverage.
2.2.-EVOLUTION OF LEVERAGE AND INCREASING RISKS
"One of the underlying features of the crisis was the build-up of excessive on-and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system. […] During the most severe part of the crisis, the banking sector was forced by the market to reduce its leverage in a manner that amplified downward pressure on asset prices, further exacerbating the positive feedback loop between losses, declines in bank capital, and the contraction in credit availability". Basel III, paragraph 152.
A first look at the evolution of leverage ratio for Euro area banks (Chart 01) does not warrant the dramatic language used in the Basel III agreement. In the run-up to the crisis, the leverage ratio remained stable at a value of 18 to 1. The subsequent decline, from 18-to-1 to 14-to-1, between 2008 and 2013 seems rather modest and does not reveal the amplified consequences of a process of deleveraging argued by the drafters of Basel III. The apparent contradiction between the risk embedded on bank leverage and the actual evolution of the leverage ratio is probably behind the use of the term "deleveraging" to mean an "undesirable" or "disorderly" contraction in total assets, as opposed to an expansion in equity. Shin (2010) Adrian and Shin (2010) shed some light on this conundrum. They argue that even stable leverage may lead to increased risks in the balance sheets of banking systems, both in the assets and the liabilities side, as it may conceal hyper-activity and pro-cyclicality. Their arguments will be illustrated with the help of an example.
Let's assume that a leverage ratio of 18 to 1 is considered sound. When a bank obtains new equity (e.g. €1,000), it will try to maximise its capacity within this "sound" leverage of 18 to 1 by expanding its balance sheet (by €18,000). To do this, the bank can accept new assets and customers for €18,000 and additional funding for €17,000 (as €1,000 is already financed with the new equity).
If this situation is repeated over time, all good borrowers may already have a mortgage and the bank will have to lower its credit standards to capture new customers. At the same time, stable long-term funding (typically deposits from households) may not expand as quickly as banks' financing needs and the bank will have to recourse to less stable funding sources: borrowing in the wholesale markets from another financial institution or institutional investors, financial innovation and securitisation… Bruno and Shin (2012a) argue that the availability (or sudden withdrawal) of non-core financing corresponds to a leverage cycle of global banks.
But Shin (2008, 2010 ) go a step further. The €1,000 of initial equity expansion may stem from an actual inflow of funds (e.g. through the issuance of new shares in the markets), but it can also be a pure accounting effect resulting from a change in the market value of an asset (or a liability). In the latter case, the bank will still have an incentive to expand its balance sheet up to €18,000, with the same increased risks mentioned above, but now without a single Euro of actual inflow to back this expansion 3 . And this is not just a theoretical hypothesis; Basel III (paragraph 52 and footnote 10) foresees the phasing out of deductions and prudential filters so that unrealised gains and losses will directly impact capital 4 . The consequence of all of this is pro-cyclical activity from banks. Boom periods with climbing asset prices can trigger massive expansions of the balance sheet while the loss of value in downturns can be amplified in dramatic deleveraging episodes.
So, if the leverage ratio conceals the actual risks, is there an alternative? This is discussed on the next section.
2.3.-FROM ABSOLUTE TO MARGINAL LEVERAGE RATIO
The previous section has shown the difficulties of the traditional measure of leverage to fully capture the evolution of risks embedded in leverage. The first step to achieve a robust understanding of leverage is to analyse how its components, assets and equity, have evolved over time. Between 2000 and 2008, both total assets and equity expanded along a very similar path (Chart 02, right-hand panel), which explains the stable leverage ratio on Chart 01. The decline in leverage from 2008 onwards is explained by a combination of a more moderate expansion of assets and sustained growth in equity.
While the leverage ratio is a snapshot of any given moment, the process of leveraging and deleveraging is linked to evolution over time. A first approach to the dynamics of leverage could be through growth rates (Chart 03). Growth for both total assets and equity evolved at similar rates until late 2008, when total assets' growth sharply decelerated while equity maintained a fairly sustained growth.
3 An alternative theory explaining the processes of leverage and deleverage is based on the debt overhang problem first illustrated by Myers (1977) . Firms in financial distress find it difficult to raise capital for new investments because the proceeds from these new investments mostly serve to increase the value of the existing debt instead of equity. At the same time, incumbent shareholders resist a bank recapitalization because their participation would be diluted. 4 In the EU, deductions and prudential filters will still be applied as far as new accounting rules on the classification of assets (IFSR 9) do not enter into force. See European Commission (2013e). This sudden decline in assets' growth seems to signal the existence of a period of deleveraging, and its potential negative effects. However, the predictive capacity of the growth of assets for signalling changes in leverage is weak. When the financial markets are mature, their evolution in terms of total activity or assets should not diverge significantly from GDP growth, an indicator of general economic activity. While during the boom period, the growth of assets in Euro area banks was higher than GDP growth, which was around 5% (European Commission, 2008), it is difficult to deduce from this information that there was a build-up of excessive leverage. It is not correct to assess leverage on the basis of just one of its components.
Most macroeconomic variables, such as prices (inflation) or GDP, are geometrical (logarithmic) in nature and expressing them in terms of growth rates is a simple tool to "linearise" them. This linearisation enables comparisons to be made between economies of a different size and facilitates analysis over long periods of time. However, to compare various items within the same balance sheet, a standardisation of size is not needed. On the contrary, under an expansionary context, the computation of growth rates can introduce a downwards bias due to a continuously increasing denominator.
This downwards bias can be avoided by expressing the evolution in terms of flows 5 , which combine the information content of both absolute terms and growth rates. The relation between total assets and equity, the leverage, stands out when both series are expressed in terms of flows (Chart 04, left-hand panel). At the same time, trends and changes are clearly outlined (Chart 04). When expressed in terms of flows, the evolution of total assets captures both episodes of boom and bust in a clearer way than percentage growth rates (Chart 05). For instance, during the run up to the crisis, flows of total assets increased 4-fold (from less than €1,000 bn a year to almost €4,000 bn), while growth rates increased only 3-fold (from 5% to less than 15%), due to the "downwards bias" generated by a continuously growing denominator.
It could be argued that this is just a matter of scale, but the series on equity refutes this argument (Chart 05, right-hand panel). With the outbreak of the crisis, banks received multiple pressures to offset losses and to increase capital buffers: new regulatory requirements 6 , stress tests (see European Banking Authority, 2011b), EBA recapitalisation exercise, public capital injections to bailout banks (see European Commission 2012d)… This reality is better captured by equity flows, which remained high as shown by the thick dotted line in Chart 05, than by growth rates, which seem to decline from a peak in 2008 (thin dotted line). The two dotted lines illustrate, once again, the downwards bias of growth rates. The Basel III Agreement of December 2010 increases the capital requirements for the banks. While it foresaw some transitional period, both markets and public authorities have applied pressure to frontload the requirements. For example, capital requirements were raised to levels higher than Basel III in some programme countries: the Irish programme required the banks to maintain a core tier 1 capital ratio of 10.5% (European Commission, 2013b, p. 61); the Greek programme required all banks to achieve a core tier 1 capital ratio of 9% by Q3-2012 and of 10% in Q2-2013 (European Commission, 2013b, p. 98); the Spanish programme requires under measure 26 for all Spanish credit institutions to meet a Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of at least 9% until at least end-2014 (European Commission 2013c, p. 42). The EBA (2011a) capital exercise of 2011 also frontloaded some of the requirements that were supposed to be implemented at a later date. Once the relevance of flows is highlighted, it is possible to calculate an alternative leverage ratio as the relation of flows of assets and flows of equity. This can be called the marginal leverage ratio as it reveals the leverage related to new activities. A major advantage with respect to the traditional absolute leverage ratio is that the marginal leverage ratio is free from the "legacy" or inertia of the overall balance sheet. In other words, banks cannot conceal new activities undertaken with high levels of leverage within their historical balance sheet structure.
Total assets and equity (in absolute terms) are somehow correlated due to the requirement to maintain a minimum amount (ratio) of prudential capital. Flows are free of that constraint so that they provide a better picture of the policy of a bank in relation to the use of leverage and its possible changes.
The marginal leverage ratio can be used as an early warning tool to signal potential episodes of excessive leverage and to understand if, and how, banks deleverage. Let's suppose that it takes 10 years to roll over the whole balance sheet of a bank. The flows accumulated throughout these 10 years would provide the same information as the balance sheet in year 10. As an early warning tool, flows provide, from the very first moment, information about what is changing in the balance sheet and potential effects in the future. This can help to assess whether or not corrective measures would be convenient without waiting for the 10 years to elapse.
Supervisory authorities could investigate avenues to integrate this new tool, the marginal leverage ratio, in their toolbox to supplement the traditional measure of leverage.
The Basel III statement about "build-up of leverage" is an implicit reference to flows. Marginal leverage ratio shows much more extreme values and with more drastic swings than the absolute leverage ratio (Chart 06). This evolution is consistent with the dramatic effects described by Basel III for both the build-up of excessive leverage and for the quick deleveraging processes. This is already evident within a Euro area series, which aggregates over 7,500 banks (a country analysis is presented in Section 4).
The next section investigates how the build-up of leverage is driven by leverage targets and valuation effects. 
EFFECTS
This section contrast the extent to which the dynamics of assets and equity in banks' balance sheets presented above have or have not played a role in the recent crisis by addressing three questions: -To what extent is leverage taking place in the banking system? -Are expansions in total assets financed by stable liabilities? -Do swings in the markets affect banks' balance sheet and can they trigger a process of leveraging-deleveraging?
3.1.-TO WHAT EXTENT IS LEVERAGE TAKING PLACE?
Section 2 shows that, in the run up to the crisis, the absolute leverage ratio for Euro area banks remained stable at a value of around 18 to 1, but the marginal leverage displayed a greater variation with peaks beyond 30 to 1 (Chart 06). Section 2 also highlights the importance of analysing the components of leverage (total assets and equity) to better grasp the dynamics behind the processes of leveraging and deleveraging.
A scatter graph allows us to plot the marginal leverage ratio and its components in a single chart. As explained in detail in Annex B.2, the data on annual flows of total assets and equity presented in Chart 04 (left-hand panel) can be translated into a Cartesian coordinate system. Net flows of assets would be shown on the vertical axis and net flows of equity on the horizontal axis (Chart 07). For instance, the big black dot on the right-hand panel corresponds to the flows accumulated in the year up to February 2004 (March 2003 -February 2004 . During this period, Euro area banks generated about €1,000 bn of new assets and €50 bn of new equity. The leverage of each observation corresponds with the slope of its radius (for instance, the observations falling on the dashed line have a marginal leverage ratio of 18 to 1 and the black dot has a marginal leverage ratio of 20 to 1).
A line could have been drawn across the dots in chronological order, but due to the many observations, this would make the chart unreadable. As an alternative, the observation period has been divided into three stages: pre-crisis (from January 2000 The scatter plot (Chart 07) shows that flows of equity always remained positive, while flows of total assets were either positive or negative (decline in total assets), in particular during the crisis phase. This is consistent with Chart 04. The mere existence of leverage makes the expansions in assets (up to €4,000 bn a year) much larger than the expansions in equity (up to €250 bn a year). As a visual indication of leverage, the left-hand panel shows all points populated close to the vertical axis. The right-hand panel zooms in the horizontal axis to facilitate the analysis of the cloud of observations. The concept of "deleveraging" is often used in a vague way. A first understanding is that it means a reduction in leverage or negative leverage. However, media, financial analysts and academia commonly interpret "deleverage" in a broader sense. They implicitly (and most of the time unknowingly) compare the absolute and the marginal leverage ratio. When new activities have a lower leverage than the overall (absolute) leverage of the balance sheet, this is interpreted as deleveraging. This corresponds to a deceleration in leverage rather than negative leverage.
The scatter plot can help to clarify the difference. Strictly speaking, all points over the bisecting line imply leverage (marginal leverage ratio higher than 1 to 1). In this sense, not only during the boom but also during (most of) the bust, banks were operating with leverage. The dashed line corresponds to a leverage ratio of 18 to 1, the absolute leverage ratio before the crisis, and marks the implicit boundary between leveraging and deleveraging relative to system average during the crisis. The points over the dashed line have a marginal leverage higher than the absolute leverage and would correspond to a build-up of leverage, in the broader sense. The points below the dashed line have a marginal leverage lower than the absolute leverage and would correspond to a phase of deleveraging in the broader sense.
In other words, a bank (or a banking system) enters in a process of deleveraging when the marginal leverage ratio crosses below the absolute leverage ratio. The distance between both ratios marks the intensity of deleveraging. The scatter plot (Chart 07) helps to understand if the process of (de)leveraging is undertaken mainly through assets or through equity.
The Chart shows how the bust shifted the cloud of observations below the dashed line. This corresponds to a process of "deleveraging" where the lower leverage in new operations pulls down the overall (absolute) leverage. A marginal leverage ratio of 10 to 1 (corresponding, for instance, to a point with €2,000 bn of total assets expansion and €200 bn of equity expansion) is indisputably much lower than an absolute leverage ratio of 18 to 1. However, a marginal leverage ratio of 10 to 1 is not trivial and it implies that a bank continues to expand its assets holdings substantially faster than its equity.
3.2.-ARE THE EXPANSIONS IN ASSETS FINANCED BY STABLE FUNDING?
To answer this question, the evolution of core and non-core liabilities and of loan-to-deposit ratio are investigated. Data on the assets of banks providing global liquidity complements the analysis.
Following Psalida and Sun (2011, p. 29 ) and Bruno and Shin (2012a) , core banking liabilities (traditional retail deposits) can be proxied by monetary aggregates (e.g. M3). Data show that most of the expansion in assets during the boom period was financed by sources other than core liabilities (Chart 08, right-hand panel). The high volatility of non-core liabilities, particularly during the downturn, illustrates the instability or risks embedded in these sources of financing. Core banking liabilities are much more stable, with flows virtually remaining always positive.
In a traditional banking system, the flows of loans closely follow the flows of deposits. This is due to the basic process of money creation, which operates through the money multiplier (see Blanchard, 2006, pp. 83-84) . The money received in the form of a loan by households or non-financial corporations is eventually returned back to the banking system in the form of a deposit and it becomes available for generating a new loan. The requirement to hold a percentage of each deposit in the form of reserves in the Central Bank avoids an explosive creation of bank money. However, data show that, before the crisis, the expansion of loans was higher than the expansion of deposits. For instance, in 2006, Euro area banks received around €600 bn of new deposits but they granted around €900 bn of new loans (Chart 09, left-hand panel). Marginal loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio 7 reached 1.6 at its peak. This means that €60 out of €160 of new loans (almost 40%) had to be financed by sources other than deposits (Chart 09, right-hand panel).
In the downturn, pressed by an environment of declining availability of funds, banks used deposits to finance assets other than loans. This is reflected in flows of loans below the flows of deposits and in a marginal LTD ratio below 1. In the year from November 2008 to October 2009, new deposits (€365 bn, Chart 09, left-hand panel) and new equity (€155 bn, Chart 04) were not sufficient to compensate for the loss of €1,150 bn of financing from non-core liabilities (Chart 08). This financing gap of €630 bn is one of the main factors explaining the pressure on banks to deleverage and the need for governments to support them. The sudden appearance of this gap stems from the collapse of non-core financing sources.
Chart 09: Loans, deposits and loan-to-deposit ratio Euro area banks Annual flows, € bn Loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio
Notes: Loans and deposits of households and NFCs. Annual flows are computed as the sum of net flows for 12 consecutive months through a rolling window. "Net" refers to new transactions minus redemptions. The "absolute" LTD ratio is computed as total loans to total deposits. The "marginal" LTD ratio is computed as annual net flows of loans to annual net flows of deposits. Last available data: February 2013. Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and own calculations. 7 The "marginal" loan-to-deposit ratio is constructed in a similar way to the marginal leverage ratio: net flows of loans to net flows of deposits. As for leverage, we consider the marginal LTD ratio provides useful insights beyond the absolute LTD ratio because the "inertia" of the overall balance sheet conceals the features of the latest banking activities. Loa n-to -depo sit r atio (marg inal) Loa n-to -depo sit r atio (a bso lute )
Chart 10: Annual flows of core and non-core assets. Banks from the Euro Area, € bn Banks from the United Kingdom, £ bn
Notes: Annual flows are computed as the sum of net flows for 12 consecutive months through a rolling window. "Net" refers to new transactions minus redemptions. Series aggregate the credit provided by banks in the form of either loans or the purchase of securities (equity, debt securities and derivatives). Core assets: credit provided to the real economy (households and nonfinancial corporations). Non-core assets: credit provided to financial institutions and non-residents. For the Euro area, an additional series is added with the assets for which a sector breakdown is not available. These "other assets" were rather minor, but became quite significant from the run up of the crisis onwards. They follow a patter similar to non-core assets. The aggregation of non-core assets and other assets makes the boom and bust profile even more pronounced. Source: European Central Bank, Bank of England and own calculations.
The improvement in banks' funding situation in the last months, the massive liquidity injections by the ECB (2011a) and other measures to promote the transformation of public support to the financial sector into credit to the real economy 8 have not led to an increase in the provision of loans by banks (ECB, 2013c, p. 23), despite the fact that banks reduced their reliance on wholesale funding and increased core funding sources (ECB, 2013b, p. 32) . It is often mentioned that banks need to repair their balance sheet in the sense of cleaning up "toxic" or riskier assets. However, an alternative interpretation of financial repair is to balance or fill the gap of fleeing non-core liabilities either with the attraction of new liabilities or with a reduction in assets. Once this has been achieved, banks will be in much better position to provide credit to the real economy.
The shift in the funding model from non-core to core liabilities is probably not the result of an active and deliberate bank policy but rather the outcome of the leverage cycle of global banks postulated by Bruno and Shin (2012a) . The authors claim that (European) global banks operate as wholesale lenders in the capital markets. They supply the non-core liabilities to local banks so that they can expand their balance sheets. For instance, a typical case in the early 2000's was the provision of funds by German banks to finance the expansion of banks in Ireland or Spain.
The distinction between core and non-core can also be applied to assets. Core banking assets would be the credit provided to the real economy (households and non-financial corporations) through loans, bonds and shares. Non-core assets would be the credit provided to other banks and other financial institutions and to foreign institutions (which are, in most cases, also financial institutions). The credit provided to governments typically contains some hybrid features. On the one hand, it is a source of funding and liquidity for the real economy, on the other, banks use sovereign bonds as high quality collateral for a variety of purposes, in particular, to obtain liquidity from the Central Banks or in the interbank markets.
Chart 10 shows how (wholesale) banks from the Euro area and the UK exponentially expanded their non-core assets in the run-up to the crisis before their holdings of such assets collapsed thereafter.
In the year to January 2008, banks from the UK provided £1,100 bn of new funds to financial institutions and non-residents (non-core assets); in the following year, British banks redeemed £550 bn more credits than the new credits they granted. This represents a decline of £1,650 bn in the flow of non-core assets provided by British banks. Euro area banks present a similar pattern.
In October 2007, they provided almost €2,300 bn new financing to other agents (non-core assets); in the year to October 2009, banks repatriated €1,100 bn of non-core assets: a total decline of €3,400 bn.
In this global liquidity cycle, the crisis triggered a reversal of cross-border claims, with funds flowing from the periphery to the core or Euro area. For instance, German and British banks repatriated the funds they previously lent to finance the expansions in Spain or Ireland (see Annex A.3 for further details).
The collapse on the provision of wholesale funding by global banks explains the unavailability of noncore liabilities for local banks (Chart 09) a few months later. Data presented in this section suggest that a significant part of the expansions in total assets was financed by non-core liabilities, which became much less available during the bust.
3.3.-TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE BALANCE SHEETS SENSITIVE TO MARKET SWINGS?
In order to answer this question, the possibility to directly deduce valuation changes from ECB series' and the extent to which balance sheet items depend on market swings is investigated. This will be combined with an analysis of the actual evolution of markets.
The ECB publishes series for both stocks (outstanding amounts) and flows. Ideally, the difference of stocks between two dates should correspond with net flows generated during that same period. However, in addition to flows, outstanding amounts incorporate other factors such as reclassifications and breaks in series, changes in exchange rates, price fluctuations or loan write-offs/write-downs 9 .
A "residual factor", for both assets and equity has been calculated, as the changes in stocks between two dates minus the net flows for that period. The aim is to assess whether this residual factor can be used as a proxy for valuation changes (Chart 11). The residual factor for total assets is rather insignificant, at least until 2010. On the other hand, the residual factor for equity seems to follow the expectations of valuation changes throughout the cycle. However, ECB methodology explains that equity is often used as the counterparty for adjustments in other parts of the balance sheet 10 . Therefore, it is not possible to use the residual factor as a proxy for valuation changes. At the same time, it is confirmed that breaks, reclassification and other adjustments have been removed from flows series'. As such, analyses based on flows are robust as the series are not contaminated by those other factors. 12-13, 28-49 and 121-126 and ECB (2006) . 10 All the adjustments are subject to a double-entry accounting system: thus adjustments always have a counterpart which will often be "capital and reserves" or "remaining liabilities", depending on the operation or the national accounting rules, ECB (2012a), p. 12. Note that these adjustments affect only the series in levels (outstanding amounts); flow series are not impacted by those adjustments. An alternative approach is to look at the classification of assets and liabilities in the balance sheet of banks, in particular, items with a strong market component (e.g. bonds, shares or derivatives). Data from both the BIS and the ECB show the assets which depend in a certain way on market valuation (Charts 12 and 13). A significant proportion of banks' balance sheets can be affected by the evolution of financial markets. This is the case for more than 25% of the balance sheet of banks in the US, Japan, the UK, Switzerland, Germany or France.
While the exact composition of banks' portfolios is not known, Kolanovic et al. (2011) argue that markets across countries and across asset classes have become increasingly correlated in the last 20 years; in other words, the major global indexes follow similar patterns. On this basis, the Eurostoxx 50 index can be used as an indication of the evolution of markets. Flows of total assets and equity seem to be highly influenced by the evolution of market indexes, at least up to early 2009 (Chart 14 
The bonsai and the gardener: using flow data to better assess financial sector leverage Three main factors explain the weakening in the relation between markets and flows since the outbreak of the crisis. First, not all financial assets are influenced by markets in the same way. Bonds are typically less risky than shares and their prices are more stable 11 . The collapse of financial markets also triggered portfolio reallocations through what is usually known as "flight to quality" (see Annex A.4, for details about the evolution of Euro area banks' portfolios).
Secondly, as explained above, adjustments in the form of write-downs, write-offs and other balance sheet adjustments are excluded from the calculation of flows. The crisis triggered significant adjustments as can be seen from the evolution of the residual factor for both total assets and equity in Chart 11 or the series "Other assets" on Chart 10.
Finally, public authorities have intervened in a major way in the financial markets and the financial system with a non-negligible effect on banks' balance sheets: liquidity injections by the ECB through open market operations, purchase of securities by the ECB, capital injections by public authorities, government guarantees on bonds… As a conclusion, data suggest that the value of many items on banks' balance sheets can be highly influenced by the evolution of markets and it cannot be excluded that market effects which impact certain items of the balance sheet could spill over to other parts of the balance sheet.
Chart 14: Market indices vs. flows of total assets and equity Euro area banks Eurostoxx 50 Index (Jan 2000=100) 1-year flows, € bn Notes: Market index correspond to monthly averages. 1-year flows are constructed as the sum of net flows for 12 consecutive months through a rolling window. Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, Bloomberg and own calculations.
3.4.-DRIVERS OF LEVERAGE: CONCLUSIONS
According to the analysis presented above, the answer to the three questions formulated at the beginning of this section could be summarised as follows:
-A process of build-up of leverage has taken place in the Euro area banking system during the early 2000s. The leveraging process continued during the crisis, with Euro area banks expanding their assets holdings faster than their equity, but at a slower path than before. These dynamics are reflected on a marginal leverage ratio lower than the absolute leverage ratio (but higher than 1 to 1) and in a declining absolute leverage ratio.
-Throughout the 2000s, the expansion in non-core liabilities remained above the expansion in core liabilities. Moreover, in the run-up to the crisis, the expansion in assets were increasingly financed by new non-core liabilities, which are less stable than core liabilities. 11 Although this is not always the case. Bonds, including sovereign bonds, can also default or lose a significant part of their value. See, for instance, the evolution of Greek, Irish and Portuguese sovereign bonds throughout the crisis. Equity -The value of many items on banks' balance sheets can be highly influenced by the evolution of markets.
The evidence presented in this section supports Adrian and Shin's thesis about the build-up of risks that can be concealed in an overtime stable leverage (see Section 2.2).
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4.-COUNTRY ANALYSIS
Section 2 introduces the marginal leverage ratio and compares its evolution with the evolution of the absolute leverage ratio for the Euro area as a whole. Such a level of aggregation can conceal strong disparities across countries and banks. In this section, country data for a selection of EU Member States will be examined. Data for all 27 EU Member States are available in Annex A.2.
Following outbreak of the crisis in 2007-2008, all countries display a reduction in leverage (Chart 15). However, values remain within a wide range: from an absolute leverage ratio below 10 to 1 in Cyprus, Greece and Spain to a leverage above 20 to 1 in Belgium, Netherlands and Germany.
Higher absolute leverage ratios do not necessarily mean a higher risk. They could be linked to different business models. Depending on the risk profile of their assets, two banks can be subject to the same amount of total risk with very different amounts of asset holdings. However, findings from the BCBS (2013c and 2013d) imply that some banks have developed advanced internal models which stretch the room for manoeuvre in accumulating risk for any given asset holding permitted under the legal framework (see Annex A.1 for details). The co-existence of different methodologies for the riskweighting of assets jeopardises the comparability of the assessment of risks provided by riskweighted assets across banks and jurisdictions. This constituted one of the main reasons for introducing a (non-risk-weighted) leverage ratio in Basel III.
While a transitional period for calibration is foreseen, Basel III imposes a unique threshold for the absolute leverage ratio. It was provisionally set at around 30 to 1 (see Section 2.1). The absolute leverage did not cross this value in the last decade in any of the EU countries (Chart 15 and Annex A.2). Therefore, this threshold for the absolute leverage ratio would not have prevented or even predicted the outbreak of the current financial crisis. This paper shows that the marginal leverage ratio supplements the absolute leverage ratio with valuable information (Section 2). This is already the case for the Euro area as a whole and becomes even more relevant at country level. In all countries, data show episodes with a marginal leverage ratios of 30-to-1, 50-to-1 or even above those figures (Chart 16 and Annex A.2). It is not possible to draw conclusions on the basis of the marginal leverage ratio alone. While investigating the origins of these extreme values for marginal leverage ratios goes beyond the purpose of this paper, they could be used by supervisory authorities to detect episodes that deserve more careful scrutiny. Borrowing from the Basel III proposal for the absolute leverage ratio, the threshold of marginal leverage ratio to trigger an in-depth review could tentatively be set at 30 to 1.
Besides detecting potential pockets of excessive leverage, the marginal leverage ratio also provides information about the deleveraging process, which is evident from the outbreak of the crisis (2007) (2008) , albeit with different patterns across countries. Banks in France, Germany and Italy underwent some periods of extreme negative marginal leverage in 2009-2011. Soon after, they came back to positive leverage with marginal leverage climbing above absolute leverage. In Spain, marginal leverage has remained subdued for a very long time. Irish banks have experienced a long period with negative and declining marginal leverage. This has impacted the absolute leverage ratio significantly, with a sharp correction from almost 25 to 1 in 2008 to less than 9 to 1 in late 2012 14 .
reflect somehow those hidden operations. For further details about (MPS), see The Economist (2013) and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_dei_Paschi_di_Siena. 14 In the context of the crisis resolution framework, Irish banks transferred a huge amount of "toxic" assets to the National Assets Management Agency (NAMA). The specific accounting treatment and the impact on marginal leverage ratio of these transfers is outside the scope of examination of this paper.
5.-CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
The findings of this paper are summarised into two main conclusions: 1) the importance of flows as a monitoring tool and 2) the usefulness to approach leverage through the marginal leverage ratio.
5.1.-THE IMPORTANCE OF FLOWS AS A MONITORING TOOL
The use of flows for monitoring the financial system constitutes a tool which has not been exploited to its full potential by financial analysts, public authorities or academia. This paper shows how flows can be used for detecting the build-up of excessive leverage and for better understanding the processes of leveraging and deleveraging. Other uses of flows are also outlined: the evolution of core and non-core assets (Chart 10); analysis of bank funding (Chart 08) and analysis of loans, deposits, and loan-to-deposit ratios (Chart 09).
The analysis of flows has a wider potential. Heath (2013) constitutes an example of how public authorities and regulators across the globe are trying to fix the data gaps that prevented them from foreseeing the arrival of the financial crisis. Were national and international authorities and institutions to be more aware of the usefulness of flows, they would collect and disseminate more data on flows.
This being said, a number of databases are already available, although not always exploited to their full potential. The ECB maintains a database with extensive information. Thousands of monthly and quarterly series are available for a wide range of assets and liabilities with various breakdowns: maturities, countries, counterparty sector… Generally, series on flows are directly available; if this is not the case, difference of stocks can be used as a proxy; although, breaks in series may become challenging. Information about the generation and use of funds, that is, data from the profits and loss account, is much more scarce: there is a lot of room for improving the breakdown and frequency of income data (income data are almost limited to a few annual series starting only in 2007 or 2008 compiled on the "Consolidated Banking Data" database).
In addition to these monetary statistics available at most central banks, the IMF and the BIS also compile noteworthy databases with data from many countries which are easily comparable. Of particular interest are the monthly IMF International Financial Statistics 15 , the quarterly BIS international locational banking statistics 16 and the quarterly BIS debt securities 17 .
Finally, the possibility of using flows for the analysis of sector accounts, which compile data for households, non-financial corporations, financial corporations and government, and which are available for many countries could be used more often 18 .
5.2.-CLOSELY MONITORING LEVERAGE: THE MARGINAL LEVERAGE RATIO
This paper introduces the marginal leverage ratio as a warning tool to signal potential episodes of excessive leverage and to understand if, and how, banks deleverage. Supervisory authorities could investigate avenues to integrate this new tool in their toolbox to supplement the traditional measure of leverage.
The analysis presented in this paper could be extended to other jurisdictions to assess if they remain valid beyond the EU and the Euro Area. It could also be extended to off-balance sheet elements.
15 It includes 32,000 time series covering more than 200 countries starting in 1948. It provides, for instance, information on the balance sheet of central banks and financial institutions. See International Monetary Fund (2013a). 16 It includes series on cross board claims by banks since the 1970s. Besides the outstanding amounts, they also calculate exchange rate adjusted changes in stocks that can be used as proxies for flows. See Bank of International Settlements (2012a). 17 Previously, the database was restricted to international debt securities, but recently it has been extended to also domestic debt securities. See Bank of International Settlements (2013a) and Bank of International Settlements (2012b). 18 For an example of the use of sector account flows, see Duc and Le Breton (2009) A bank-by-bank analysis is another potential extension. This could be undertaken either through the financial statements published by banks or through an anonymous microdata database 19 . Examples of questions worth exploring would include: to what extent is the hyper-activity of banks correlated within a country? Do country aggregates conceal extreme values in specific banks? Are the episodes of extreme values in the marginal leverage ratio provoked by just a few banks within a given country or does it correspond to group herd behaviour?
ANNEX A -ADDITIONAL CHARTS
This annex presents the following supplementary charts with a short explanation: risk profile or advanced risk models, absolute and marginal leverage ratio for all EU countries, TARGET2 balances and Euro area banks' portfolios of shares and bonds.
A.1. RISK PROFILE OR CAPITAL EFFICIENCY
Chart A01 shows the ratio between risk-weighted assets (RWA) and total assets (TA). If the riskweight were to indicate accurately the risk and all the banks were to use the same model, that ratio of RWA to TA would indicate the risk profile of each bank. Capital regulation sets risk-weights for a broad category of products. However, because it difficult to establish the actual risk of financial assets beforehand, banks are allowed to use their own internal models to assess the risk of their portfolios. These models are normally based on probabilistic mathematical models built on the concept of value at risk (VaR) for market risk or on probabilities of default (PDs) and loss given default (LGDs) for credit risk. Those advanced models usually yield a lower risk profile than the generic weights proposed in legislation.
Chart A01: Risk-weighted assets to total assets Country aggregates for a sample of banks, December 2011, % Source: EBA -Capital exercise, Bloomberg and own calculations.
The rationale of the flexibility allowed by the legislator was for banks to be able to assess their risks more accurately. However, in some cases, banks have interpreted that flexibility as a quest for "capital efficiency". Bruno and Shin (2012a, Figure 4) show how, for Barclays, risk-weighting barely changed, even when the raw assets are adjusted by large amounts. Similarly, Nordea's CEO Christian Clausen (2013, Part 5, minutes 19:20 to 21:00) explains how banks try to structure their lending in a way that requires the least risk-weighted assets. Indeed, as measured in Chart A01, the Swedish banking system is the second most "efficient" one in terms of capital.
Basel III (paragraph 152) understands the leverage ratio as a supplement of risk based capital requirements, that allows the build-up of leverage in the banking sector to be constrained and to reinforce the risk based requirements with a simple, non-risk based "backstop" measure. The ECB does not publish flow data for Denmark and the UK (although, at least for the UK, they are available at the National Central Bank). For these two countries, the annual flows have been replaced with the difference of stocks.
Chart A02a: Absolute vs. marginal leverage ratios and components Absolute vs. marginal leverage ratios, no. of times Flows of assets vs. flows of equity, € bn Belgium
Bulgaria

Czech Republic
Notes: The absolute leverage ratio is constructed as total assets to total equity. The marginal leverage ratio is computed as annual net flows of total assets to annual net flows of equity. Net flows correspond to annual flows which are computed as the sum of net flows for 12 consecutive months through a rolling window. "Net" refers to new transactions minus redemptions. Pre-crisis: Jan-2000 to Sep-2004; Run-up: Oct-2004 to Sep-2008 Decline: Oct-2008 Since the outbreak of the crisis in summer 2007, claims between National Central Banks of the Euro area and the Eurosystem (and vice versa), the so called TARGET2 balances, have expanded considerably. According to Cecchetti et al. (2012) TARGET2 balances can be interpreted as reflecting a reduction (or reversal) of credit extended from core European banks to borrowers in peripheral Europe. They also point out that TARGET2 stem from a shift of international financial intermediation from the private sector to the public sector (page 2).
Given that the initial cross-border interbank credit was not reflected on TARGET2 balances, the international flow of funds in the early 2000s and its reversal with the outbreak of the crisis seem to have followed different channels. Therefore, the reestablishment of the traditional flow of interbank credit does not necessarily entail a reduction in the TARGET2 balances, which may become persistent. Banks hold higher amounts of bonds (over €3,500 bn) than of shares and equity (€750 bn) , because bonds are more linked to the core business of banks (provide credit), while equity investment is of a different nature. The proportion of both portfolios has remained rather stable (12% of bonds and 4% of shares and equity) until the crisis triggered a reallocation of portfolios. In addition to the effect of prices, banks actively sold shares (up to €100 bn a year) and bought increasing amounts of bonds (up to €600 bn a year), a phenomenon usually known as "flight to quality". As a consequence of the evolution of market value and the active management of portfolios by banks, in early 2013, the portfolio of shares had declined below 3% of total assets and that of bonds had increased to almost 14%.
Chart A04: Banks portfolios: bonds and shares Euro area banks Total stock, € bn Net annual flows, € bn Total stock, % of total assets Notes: "Bonds" includes all securities other than shares. "Shares" includes also other types of equity. Data from consolidated accounts, so that bonds and shares of other banks are not included. "Net annual flows" are constructed as the sum of net flows for 12 consecutive months through a rolling window. "Net" refers to new transactions minus redemptions. Source: ECB and own calculations. 
B.2. USE OF SCATTER PLOTS TO REPRESENT LEVERAGE AND ITS COMPONENTS
A scatter plot allows the three main variables of this paper: assets (flows), equity (flows) and (marginal) leverage to be captured in a single chart. Assets and equity are represented on each one of the two axes and the leverage corresponds to the slope of each observation.
Evolution can be represented with a line which joins the observations in a chronological order (for instance, the line going from point X to point Y and then to point Z marks the chronological evolution). However, when a chart includes many observations, adding a chronological line can make the chart unreadable. As an alternative, this analysis divides the sample into three periods (a "pre-crisis" period from January 2000 to September 2004, a "run-up" period from October 2005 to September 2008 and a "decline" period from October 2008 to the last observations, February 2013), using different colours to represent different periods. The outbreak of the crisis occurred with a certain amount of lag across countries. However, to facilitate comparisons, the same three periods for all countries have been maintained.
Chart B03: Scatter Plot, Euro area banks Evolution of annual flows, € bn Scatter Plot, € bn
Notes: Annual flows are constructed as the sum of net flows for 12 consecutive months through a rolling window. "Net" refers to new transactions minus redemptions. Source: ECB and own calculations. The volume of assets and equity is always a positive magnitude, meaning that its representation in a scatter plot will always fall in the first quadrant. However, flows can either be positive (increases) or negative (decreases). As a consequence, observations of flows of assets and equity can appear in any of the four quadrants (Chart B04, right-hand panel).
Chart B04: Scatter Plot, Belgian banks Evolution of annual flows (2 axis), € bn Scatter Plot, € bn Notes: Annual flows are constructed as the sum of net flows for 12 consecutive months through a rolling window. "Net" refers to new transactions minus redemptions. Source: ECB and own calculations.
Declines in equity (negative flows) imply an increase in leverage. As a consequence, flows of equity enter the formula of marginal leverage ratio as absolute values (see Equation B01 ).
= ( )
(Equation B1)
The observations falling in octants B, C and D clearly have a positive marginal leverage ratio while the ones falling in octants F, G and H clearly have a negative marginal leverage ratio. The situation is more ambiguous for the points in octant A as they correspond to observations with leverage below 1to-1. It could be argued that these points need to switch signs, but I will stick to the outcome of Equation B1. As can be seen from Chart B04, the observations falling in this octant are quite rare and they only correspond to a transition between positive to negative leverage. Octant E is a similar case. A final remark needs to be made about the meaning of extreme values in the marginal leverage ratio and, in particular, the effect of a small denominator as shown by the following quantitative illustration. Let's suppose that a bank has €100 assets and €10 equity, so that its leverage is 10 to 1. Starting from this point, a leverage of 20 to 1 can be achieved either with €200 assets and €10 equity 
